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Introduction
I HAVE focused this discussion on neo-liberal economics because this is now the dominant form. It is dominant in universities in the United States, 
and it exercises a dominant influence on the institutions that support the 
global economy. This includes the government of the United States and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the World Trade Organization.
I have described my critique as Buddhist-Christian. By this I do not mean 
anything esoteric. Although I am interested in differences between these two 
great religious traditions, I do not believe these differences are important for 
the critique of the dominant pattern of economic thinking. It is interesting 
that an early critic who wrote on “Buddhist Economics” was a conservative 
Catholic. I refer, of course, to Schumacher.
A critique of neo-liberal economics can emphasize either the theory or the 
practice. Both critiques are important, and a Buddhist or Christian perspec­
tive can inform either one. I have chosen to emphasize the theoretical one, al­
though I will also indicate how theory works out in practice. What is wrong, 
from a Buddhist or Christian point of view, with the theory of neo-liberal 
economics?
* This paper was originally presented at the Eastern Buddhist Society Public Lecture at 
Otani University on May 18, 2002.
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Before launching into such a critique, I want to note that a quite similar 
critique could be directed to many of the academic disciplines. Economics as 
a discipline is not worse than others from a Buddhist or Christian point of 
view. The difference is that it is the discipline that has succeeded most bril­
liantly. It has the ear of policy makers and corporate leaders, that is, of those 
who are in fact shaping the future of the world.
I. Academic Disciplines
Part of what is wrong with all the academic disciplines is that their shared 
understanding of the way knowledge should be pursued and organized is 
wrong from a Buddhist or Christian perspective. Too often it is supposed that 
any rigorous pursuit of specialized knowledge must take the form of one of 
these academic disciplines. This is not true, and the assumption that it is true 
has caused great harm. Let me explain.
The academic disciplines are children of the European Enlightenment. 
There is much to be said positively about the achievements of the Enlighten­
ment and its children, the disciplines, but today I am attending chiefly to 
what is wrong. This draws attention to the worldview of the Enlightenment. 
Deliberately and consciously the Enlightenment thinkers reacted against the 
Medieval understanding of the world in which organic models played a pri­
mary role. They proposed that, instead, the machine be taken as the basic 
model. The clock was the machine most often in view.
There were two particularly important changes involved. The first was the 
rejection of teleology. Organisms behave purposefully, and Medieval think­
ers, influenced by Aristotle, gave a great deal of attention to teleology. One 
could understand the behavior of an organism when one understood its pur­
poses. One could understand any part of the universe when one understood the 
role it played in the whole. Early modem thinkers rightly saw that this preoccu­
pation with teleology had misdirected much thought and research. To under­
stand the world, they were convinced, one should focus on efficient causes.
Of course, clocks also serve purposes. But the purposes are not inherent in 
the clock. The behavior of the clock is to be explained in detail by the me­
chanical forces operating among its parts. The parts behave as they do, not 
because of their intrinsic nature or purposes, but because they are compelled 
to do so by pressures exerted on them by other parts.
Teleological questions are appropriate only if we ask why the clock exists 
at all. Here we appeal to human purposes. To understand the working of the 
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clock we attend only to efficient causes. Similarly, if we ask why the great 
world machine exists, we appeal to the purposes of God. If we ask how the 
world machine operates, we attend only to efficient causes.
A second feature of the machine in contrast to the organism is that it is 
essentially unchanged by a change in its environment. Organisms require 
particular types of environments in order to survive. Even within those lim­
its, their behavior is extensively affected by the nature of their environments. 
An animal in a small cage behaves very differently from the same animal in 
the wild. The animal appears to be internally affected by its environment. 
That is, its reality in-and-for-itself is informed by its relations to the things in 
its environment. The organism is internally related to its environment.
Within extreme limits, a clock remains what it is, virtually unchanged, in 
many different environments. An account of the behavior of the clock can 
ignore its environment. Of course, a clock can be smashed by an axe. It is not 
impervious to external objects. But the impact of the axe on the clock is of 
the same order as that of one part of the clock on another. It is a mechanical 
force. The clock does not appear to be internally related to anything else.
When Enlightenment thinkers decided that the whole of nature operated in 
terms of mechanical forces, they concluded that the apparent difference 
between organisms and mechanisms was only apparent. In reality, they as­
sumed, a deeper analysis of organisms would show that their behavior was 
also explained by efficient causes operating among their parts or on them 
from without. The effect of the environment upon them was also by external, 
mechanical causes. Organisms are no more purposeful or interconnected 
than machines.
Since the world operates mechanically, apparent wholes can be under­
stood by analysis into their parts. Each of these parts can be analyzed into its 
parts, and so forth. This analysis should proceed until we arrive at those parts 
that are indivisible and therefore not further analyzable. These are the atoms. 
Ultimately, the whole natural world can, in principle, be explained by atoms 
moving in relation to one another according to the laws of motion.
The feature of this cosmology that most influenced the organization of 
research into academic disciplines was the view that the parts could be sepa­
rated from one another for purposes of analysis. Their relations to one anoth­
er were not important to understanding them. Hence bits and pieces of the 
totality of things could become the subject of an academic discipline that 
could then develop suitable methods of study with little attention to what was 
happening in other disciplines.
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Of course, this simplifies matters in several ways. The most important is 
that it ignores another feature of the Enlightenment, its dualism. The more 
emphatically nature was denied any intemality and purposiveness, the clear­
er it was that human minds are different from nature. The study of human 
minds and what they do in the world, accordingly, was separated sharply 
from the study of nature. Since Kant, this distinction has been formalized in 
terms of the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. In English 
we often distinguish the sciences and the humanities.
Even so, both the sciences and the humanities are organized into 
Wissenschaften, or academic disciplines. These continued to be understood 
as each having its own subject matter, clearly demarcated in its separation 
from others. Each discipline, once established, was free to develop the meth­
ods it found most fruitful for the study of its subject matter. Analytical meth­
ods predominated in the humanities as in the natural sciences.
When the distinction was first established, the study of society was not far 
advanced. But as social studies developed, there was some question as to 
whether they should belong to the humanities or to the sciences. On the 
whole, they have preferred to be social sciences. Economics, in particular, 
has prided itself on its scientific character.
Economics has been particularly successful in establishing its subject mat­
ter as separate and distinct from the subject matter of other social sciences. It 
has developed its methods for investigating that subject matter. Like the nat­
ural sciences, it has transformed itself largely into mathematics. This is par­
ticularly true of the neo-liberal economics that is our topic.
Clearly this view of reality, which is presupposed in the disciplinary orga­
nization of knowledge, and specifically in the discipline of economics, is 
deeply alien to the worldview of both Buddhism and Christianity. Nothing 
could be more central to the Buddhist worldview than the profound inter­
connectedness of things. For Christians this has not been quite so explicit. 
But the understanding of the world in the Bible and in the Christian tradition 
prior to the Enlightenment is certainly organic rather than mechanistic. The 
Hebrew understanding of “the land” certainly implied relations to nature that 
are excluded in the mechanistic worldview.
Of course, there can be no denying that the separative and analytic ap­
proach has led to an enormous increase in information about the world and 
its processes. The Enlightenment and its expression in the organization of 
knowledge into academic disciplines has been a brilliant success. Never­
theless, from the point of view of both Buddhism and Christianity, the vast 
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increase in information has been gained at the price of a loss of wisdom.
Defenders of the academic disciplines often claim that all that is needed is 
that the results attained in the various disciplines be added to one another and 
integrated. But this is hardly possible. The results are formulated in cate­
gories peculiar to each discipline. Integrating even two disciplines turns out 
to be a truly formidable job. Furthermore, much about the world has been 
excluded from all the disciplines. For example, the complex interconnections 
of things are in principle excluded, as is the purposive element in all but the 
human. Even in the study of the human, there is some embarrassment about 
a full acknowledgment of the complexity of human purposes.
Despite this criticism, we can agree that when we keep in mind the ab­
straction that is involved in each discipline from reality as a whole, we can 
profit from the information offered without being led seriously astray. The 
problem comes when we move too directly from the findings of a discipline 
to application in the real world. At that point, neglect in practice of all that 
the discipline has neglected in theory can have disastrous results.
II. The Discipline of Economics
The discipline of economics is, today, being applied to reality without appre­
ciation for the way it has abstracted particular features of that reality from the 
whole. Economists at their best know that human behavior in markets is only 
one aspect of human behavior. They recognize that the increase of market 
activity is only one contribution to human well-being. They acknowledge 
that there are other ways of studying human beings that also throw light on 
what policies should be pursued.
The problem is that our social and political leaders have decided that 
increased wealth is the most worthy of all goals. They rightly believe that 
knowledge of how wealth can be increased is the province of economic the­
ory and that economists are those best qualified to guide policy toward this 
end. If we are to criticize economists, it is to point out that they have been all 
too willing to agree that wealth is the supreme goal and that, therefore, they 
are the best counselors of national and global policy. But our most basic crit­
icism must be directed toward ourselves and our leaders, rather than toward 
the economists to whom we have turned for guidance.
Clearly Buddhists and Christians cannot agree that wealth is the supreme 
goal of social and political policy. Buddhists know that attachment to world­
ly goods, and certainly to their increase, blocks the path of spiritual advance. 
5
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXIV, 2
A culture focused on this end is deeply sick. Christians believe the first task 
of government is justice, and they see that the pursuit of wealth profoundly 
interferes with the achievement of justice. We know also that Jesus was very 
explicit in asserting that we cannot serve both God and wealth.
That does not mean that either Buddhists or Christians oppose the acquisi­
tion of material goods. Buddhism is the middle way, eschewing asceticism. 
Christians believe that the Earth and all its creatures are good and that peo­
ple are free to use its resources. Both Buddhists and Christians want the basic 
needs of all to be met. We do not oppose the enjoyment of additional goods. 
But we deeply, fundamentally, oppose placing the quest for wealth first. For 
Christians, the call is to seek first the Kingdom of God, a world in which 
God’s will is done. Justice, peace, and meeting the basic needs of all are 
much higher priorities than simply increasing overall wealth.
Even if there were nothing else to criticize about economic theory, Bud­
dhists and Christians would have to oppose the role that economic thought 
plays in our world today. But the general comments made thus far, point 
toward other features of Enlightenment thought that are fully adopted by the 
academic discipline of economics, especially in its neo-liberal form. We will 
turn now to two of them.
III. Homo economicus
First, economic theory is based on a particular view of human beings. Econo­
mists all know that Homo economicus is an abstraction from the fullness of 
human reality. This is just as true of Homo politicus, Homo religiosus, Homo 
faber, or Homo ludens. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with examining 
human behavior in market transactions in some separation from human be­
havior in political or religious activities.
Economists observed that when we buy and sell, we quite consistently 
seek to get the best bargains we can and sell as dearly as we can. When we 
need work, we try to get the best job we can, with pay a major consideration. 
When we need help, we try to get that as inexpensively as possible. Econ­
omists abstracted this tendency from all the other human tendencies and at­
tributed it to Homo economicus. They describe Homo economicus as devoted 
to personal economic gain.
It is not the case, of course, that all of our economic activity conforms to 
this norm. For one thing, our economic dealings within the family rarely do. 
Economists recognize this, and often speak of households as the economic 
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units instead of individuals. But the boundaries of households are often 
blurred, and in any case households do not act consistently in purely self­
serving ways. An interest in being fair, plays some role in our economic 
dealings. Also people give large sums of money, much of it out of concern to 
promote the general good or meet particular needs of others. Economists do 
not do well in accounting for these activities. But when all qualifications are 
made, it remains true that a great deal about human behavior in the market­
place can be described and predicted accurately when the people involved 
are viewed as economists see them.
Homo economicus is also understood to have insatiable wants. Some early 
economists thought that the goal of the economy was to produce sufficient 
goods to meet the needs of all. Growth would then give way to a steady-state 
economy. However, the profession as a whole rejected this view. It judged 
that human wants were insatiable. This did not mean that the desire for a par­
ticular good could not be satisfied. It meant that there was no limit to the new 
wants that could arise as old ones are satisfied. There is obviously a measure 
of truth in this understanding of human beings in their economic behavior. 
The kinds of things that would have satisfied me fifty years ago no longer 
suffice. For example, I want faster communications, easier travel, and more 
space and facilities in my home.
Clearly Homo economicus is a useful abstraction for many purposes. 
Nevertheless, when description passes over to prescription, consequences 
are often disastrous. With respect to the insatiability of desires, we do not 
simply observe this as a fact of human existence everywhere and at all 
places. On the contrary, we have created a system designed to generate new 
desires. Perfectly functional goods are quickly rendered obsolete by new 
designs. Styles are systematically changed from year to year to encourage 
new purchases. Much of the advertising industry is designed to persuade us 
to desire new things. Our whole economy is built on the basis of ever-in­
creasing consumption, which, in turn, adds endlessly to the stress upon the 
environment. Creating unsatisfied wants fuels an unsustainable system.
It is obvious that neither Buddhism nor Christianity can support this doc­
trine or the practice that follows from it. Buddhism emphasizes that true life 
comes from the abandonment of all craving. Our system posits and encour­
ages limitless craving. Christianity sometimes suggests that craving for spir­
itual goods is desirable, but it gives no support to craving for unneeded 
material possessions and consumption. There could hardly be a flatter con­
tradiction.
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The conflict is equally sharp with respect to the economist’s view that 
human beings behave self-interestedly. Buddhists and Christians may agree 
that there is a strong tendency in this direction. But we deplore this and en­
courage other tendencies.
Economists, on the other hand, call the selfish behavior they describe “ra­
tional.” They show that rational behavior leads to greater wealth not only on 
the part of those individuals who practice it but also in society as a whole. 
At this point, they tend to forget that wealth is only one of many goods, and 
that other academic disciplines study some of these other goods. Many of 
them forget that from the point of view of these other disciplines, human 
community is a value. Hence, they tend to advocate policies that support the 
behavior they call “rational,” even though it erodes or destroys human com­
munity.
This encouragement of “rational” behavior played an important role in 
development thinking in the years after World War II. Development workers 
often found that the people they worked with were quite loath to leave the 
villages in which they lived. However, standard economic development the­
ory focused on increasing productivity, that is, the amount of goods pro­
duced per hour of human labor. This could be accomplished best by 
industrialization. That required people working on small peasant farms to 
work in factories instead, which were located in urban centers. Accord­
ing to economic theory, they should be glad to go if the factories paid 
more than peasant work. But in fact, most of the people involved prized 
their community participation more than increased income. They were, in 
economic language, “irrational.” Their traditionalism was an obstacle to 
economic progress. The great need was seen as “modernization” or “ratio­
nalization,” which meant the subordination of community to economic 
growth.
If development economists had been more inclined to study history, they 
would have known that this was not a new problem. One factor that helped 
produce a labor force for the industrial revolution in England was the enclo­
sure movement. When landholders shifted from peasant farming to raising 
sheep, far less labor was needed. Accordingly, they evicted peasants from 
their land. Those who had been evicted had no choice but wage labor, much 
of it in factories. When colonial governments in Africa found that natives 
were reluctant to work on plantations or roads, they required them to pay 
taxes in cash, which they could obtain only by wage labor. People are not by 
nature primarily Homo economicus. The social and economic system turns
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them into this kind of creature. From the point of view of Buddhism and 
Christianity, this is not a gain.
In recent decades, a main contributor to creating a labor force for indus­
trialization has been another part of the development model. According to 
the dominant economic development model, since traditional societies are 
primarily agricultural, agriculture should produce surpluses of international­
ly wanted products that would bring in foreign currencies needed for indus­
trialization. Neo-colonial agribusiness was the best instrument for achieving 
this end. Accordingly, governments cooperated with international agricultur­
al interests to enable them to create large plantations. By introducing modem 
agricultural practices and monoculture, these could increase productivity, 
that is, the amount produced by each worker. Peasants deprived of access to 
land and not needed in corporate agriculture contributed to the industrial 
labor force.
It is not only peasants who are forced to become more productive. The 
same is true of artisans. In traditional societies, there are specialists in the 
making of many needed goods. Shoes can serve as an example. The cobbler 
engages in the whole process of making a pair of shoes, often on order for a 
particular customer. There is pride and satisfaction in the work. Even if he 
can earn more by working in a factory, he will find the loss of job satisfac­
tion outweighs the increased income.
However, once a shoe factory is established, most cobblers have no 
choice. The price of shoes produced by the shoe factory is well below the 
price at which they must sell in order to live. Some cobblers may survive by 
repairing factory-made shoes. But most must become part of the wage labor 
force.
Again, my purpose is to point out that the economists’ description of how 
most of us act in our economic dealings most of the time, has become a 
norm. People who do not want to act that way are forced to do so. The val­
ues of community life and creative work are destroyed for the sake of the 
greater wealth that can be produced when people behave in the manner of 
Homo economicus.
The communities that are being destroyed now include national ones. 
When Adam Smith wrote in 1776, his goal was to increase the wealth of 
nations. He took national community for granted as the context of economic 
activity. But economic theory as such has no place for community. It demon­
strates that the market works best when it is large. Indeed, the larger the bet­
ter. This allows for the economies of scale, so important to economists, along 
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with the competition among corporations that is essential to the whole 
process. National boundaries are thus an impediment to economic efficiency. 
The goal, now largely realized, is a global economy.
Obviously, there is resistance. We are Homo politicus as well as Homo 
economicus. Until fairly recently, our overall global behavior reflected our 
political nature more than our economic nature. We fought wars for national 
advantage, not global economic gain. But today, nations like the United 
States, which would not dream of sacrificing sovereignty to an international 
political body such as the United Nations, are prepared to sacrifice it to eco­
nomic institutions for the sake of economic growth.
Of course, the real destruction of national community is going on chiefly 
in poorer countries, as a result of structural adjustment and such treaties as 
NAFTA. The goal is the erasure of national boundaries so far as the econo­
my is concerned. Since the governments are expected to serve the economy, 
they cannot act for the sake of national well-being in any terms beyond con­
tributing to the growth of the global economy. Some economists assure them 
that by doing this, they will eventually share in the global prosperity, but thus 
far, and for the foreseeable future, this does not apply to most of their citi­
zens. The gap in wealth between the affluent and the poor in each country has 
greatly increased. It is acutely difficult to maintain real national community 
between the newly affluent, who benefit from the global economy, and the 
disempowered and impoverished who are exploited by it. Similarly as the 
gap between affluent and impoverished nations grows, the ideal of a com­
munity of nations evaporates.
IV. Dualism
A second principle underlying economic theory is equally explicit and equal­
ly offensive to Buddhists and Christians. It is the dualism of the human and 
the natural. On this point also, Buddhist teaching is especially emphatic. The 
rejection of dualism is central to the Buddhist worldview. Christians, espe­
cially Western Christians, on the other hand, have had dualistic tendencies 
for centuries.
Nevertheless, today, Christian theologians for the most part reject dual­
ism, at least in its more extreme forms, and biblical scholars point out that it 
is alien to the Bible. We Christians are repenting of having succumbed to 
dualistic thinking through the influence of Greek thought and, especially, 
in extreme form, the effects of Enlightenment thought on Protestantism.
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As apenitent Christian, I join Buddhists in strongly opposing this dualism.
But no such repentance is occurring in the mainstream of economic 
thought. For traditional economists, and emphatically for neo-liberal ones 
today, the only value that is recognized is that of human satisfaction. The 
only form of satisfaction that is recognized is that derived from the posses­
sion or consumption of desired goods and services. Economists encourage 
the ordering of the economy to the end of increasing human satisfaction.
The only value that can be attributed to the non-human world is instru­
mental. It can serve toward the satisfaction of human wants. Its value is the 
price that someone is prepared to pay for it. It is viewed as a commodity.
Given the standard Enlightenment view of the world as composed of hu­
man subjects and non-human objects, this dualism of humans and commodi­
ties seems appropriate. It is derived from the idea that the non-human world 
is available for the market, so that market forces can price it, and economists 
recognize that this is not quite true. For example, people value unspoiled 
landscapes, which are not for sale in the market. However, this is viewed as 
a minor qualification. Economists can approximate a market-price by asking 
people how much they would pay to preserve this landscape and multiplying 
the figure by the number of people who would be willing to pay it.
The dualism is applied, with few qualms, when considering non-human 
animals. A cow is worth whatever price it brings in the market. The same is 
true of a cat. The cat’s value may be raised by human sentiment, but there is 
still likely to be some price at which its owners would part with it. What is 
totally omitted is the value of the cow or the cat for itself, the satisfactions it 
derives from being alive.
Christianity historically has not been very clear about the intrinsic value of 
animals. It fell victim to Enlightenment dualism with little struggle. Never­
theless, it is beginning a process of repentance, and I personally insist that as 
Christians we have strong reasons to oppose the denial by economic theory 
of all value to animals. The affirmation of such value has been strongest and 
clearest in the religions of India. Buddhism shares in that heritage, although 
its commitment to the intrinsic value of animals has been seriously weakened 
in its East Asian forms. Still, this commitment is sufficiently prominent in 
the tradition to provide contemporary Buddhists with a basis for protest 
against the economic theory that the only value of animals is the price 
humans will pay for them and the factory farming that it supports.
The commodification of nature expresses itself in other ways. In tradition­
al society, much is held in common. Indeed, the natural environment is 
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thought of more as part of the community than as a possession. The dualism 
of the economist is absent. All members of the community can have access 
to the forests and streams, and sometimes also the pastureland.
To many neo-liberal economists, this practice appears irrational. Since 
these goods have value, they should be privatized and priced, so that those 
who use them will pay for this use. Privatization insures the most economic 
use of the resources.
Of course, privatization also favors those in a position to purchase them 
and damages the poor. Today, one feature of the negotiations over the Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas is the privatization of water. Dualism dri­
ves in the direction of the commodification of everything. Of course, the pol­
icy of privatization also expresses the primacy of the commitment to increase 
wealth over the goal of meeting the needs of the poor. At this point, Buddhists 
and Christians can join humanists of many stripes in protesting.
Christians can be much clearer in their opposition to the reduction of the 
value of natural things to their price than about the intrinsic value of animals. 
As we have become aware of impending scarcities, we have realized that 
market-price is a poor guide even to the instrumental value of commodities 
to human beings. For example, as long as there are large pools of oil in the 
ground, the price of oil will be determined by the policies of oil-producing 
countries as to how much to pump. Oil could remain plentiful in the market 
until very near the time that it was, for practical purposes, exhausted. Indeed, 
if OPEC does not control production with somewhat longer-term concerns in 
view, market forces will probably lead to that outcome. The actual value of 
oil for human society is far greater than the market-price. The additional 
price will be paid when we are forced to make a rather abrupt transition to 
other forms of energy. It would be much better if oil were priced according­
ly, but the market will not accomplish that. It can be done only if the politi­
cal order, which can reflect longer-term concerns, takes precedence over the 
commitment to the economic one.
The critique here is that the market to which economists turn for estab­
lishing value is shortsighted. Human beings are capable of rational judg­
ments based on a longer view of things. Christian teaching has been clear 
that this historical perspective is important. We need to identify our calling 
in terms of where we stand in an ongoing history. If we do so, we will rec­
ognize needs before market-prices reflect them. This does not directly chal­
lenge economists’ dualism, but it does object to the conclusions they draw 
from it.
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More broadly, the dualism of the economists has rendered them as a group 
largely indifferent to the degradation of the Earth. One can, of course, find 
economic reasons for avoiding this degradation. But the struggle to save the 
natural environment has not been led by those who view it as a commodity. 
It has been led by those who see it as having value in itself and as intimately 
interconnected with human well-being. I count Buddhists and Christians 
among these. For twenty years, the World Council of Churches has spoken 
of Christian commitment to the “integrity of creation.” Christians have debated 
exactly what that phrase means, but we all know that it expresses the convic­
tion that God cares about the creation and that the interconnectedness of 
things in the created order must be recognized and protected. Economics as 
an academic discipline has not internalized any such principle. It is our duty 
to critique the dualistic theory and oppose the practices that follow from it.
V. Can We Propose as Well as Oppose?
Many Buddhists and Christians believe that community as such has values, 
and that communities often preserve and transmit rich traditions that make 
for a good life. We believe that many traditional communities were much 
more sustainable and better integrated with their natural environments than 
are the societies with which development and economic globalization have 
replaced them. We believe that modem economic development has de­
stroyed, and is still destroying, much of great value. The Buddhist and 
Christian critique of the application of economic thinking to the real world is 
very harsh.
But when we protest this destruction, we are often challenged to show that 
there is another way of responding to global poverty. All of us agree that in 
the years after World War II, there were unmet human needs in many parts 
of the world. In many villages, most infants failed to reach the age of one. 
Preventable diseases ravaged whole countries. Hunger was a frequent prob­
lem. Development was intended to overcome these problems. Could Bud­
dhists or Christians oppose development?
Furthermore, we should not romanticize the virtues of village life. It was 
often highly exploitative. Sometimes, as in India, there were whole classes of 
the excluded. Women were often degraded. Sometimes, as in parts of Africa, 
they were the objects of appalling operations. Development was intended to 
break the power of unjust and destructive traditions. Could we oppose that?
That would certainly not have been a possible position for Buddhists and 
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Christians. The question was not then and is not now whether there should be 
development. The question was and is, what kind of development is helpful. 
After fifty years of development that has been highly successful in increasing 
global wealth, none of the problems that validly called for development has 
been solved. Where there has been progress, as in infant survival, this has 
resulted from targeted programs more than from the general increase of 
wealth. To challenge the pursuit of global wealth is not to oppose develop­
ment, but to call for that kind of development that genuinely responds to 
urgent human need.
Supporters of present economic policies often speak as if the alternative to 
global capitalism is state socialism, and they rightly point to its limitations. 
Buddhists and Christians have generally been quite aware of these limita­
tions. But the issue is, in fact, quite different. The alternative to the top-down 
development programs of both global capitalism and state socialism is bot- 
tom-up development.
Bottom-up development is often called community development. Instead 
of viewing persons as individual atoms related to one another through con­
tracts and market transactions, we view people as persons-in-community, 
valuing the relations that constitute community. Our interest is in developing 
communities and thereby improving the situation of the persons who make 
them up.
This is the kind of development that Gandhi promoted. A symbol of 
Gandhian development was the sewing-machine. This kind of simple tech­
nology would enable women in villages to use their time efficiently and prof­
itably during periods when they did not need to work in the fields. Gandhi 
also worked to overcome the discrimination against the untouchables in 
these villages. Gandhian development is open to improving the situation of 
women socially as well as economically. Village development should be, 
can be, and often is, both economic and ethical. At every point, it should 
involve the villagers in decision-making. They often know their problems 
and needs better than anyone else. Also, if they have ownership over the 
woods-plots or pumps that improve their community life, they will care for 
them and keep them operative. The cost of improving conditions within vil­
lages is usually modest in relation to the returns.
Often villagers already have a strong sense of their interconnection with 
their environment and of the importance of maintaining or developing a sus­
tainable relationship. When they act in unsustainable ways, this is often 
because their traditional systems have been disrupted and they can survive
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only by destructive practices. Their unsustainable activities are usually the 
consequence of top-down development. The task of bottom-up development 
is to counter these effects.
The Buddhist Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka adopted the Gandhian 
vision. Here, too, the primary focus has been on the restoration and strength­
ening of village life. Local irrigation systems, destroyed by British colonial 
governments, are being rebuilt, and the water buffalo agriculture, renewed.
Of course, top-down development has already driven many people from 
traditional villages into the slums surrounding great metropolitan areas. It is 
too late for village development to help them. Another bottom-up model has 
been developed in the new urban context. It began in Bangladesh and has 
spread around the world. This is micro-lending.
Small sums are loaned to poor, enterprising individuals, to start their own 
tiny businesses. Most of the recipients are women. Often they gather in 
mutual support groups. The results have been astonishingly successful. The 
great majority of the borrowers repay their loans and significantly increase 
their incomes. Their self-esteem and ability to support others also increase 
markedly. Buddhists and Christians can support this kind of development 
with enthusiasm.
Most Buddhist and Christian development activity around the world has 
this bottom-up character in one form or another. Hence, I am not simply 
describing a theoretical ideal. The problem is that this is sometimes thought 
of as the consequence of limited resources rather than basic conviction. 
Many who support this kind of development also give moral and political 
support to the top-down policies that dominate the global economic system. 
It is incumbent on those of us who are in a position to influence the thinking 
of faithful people to make clear that the neo-liberal economic thought that in­
forms most current top-down development, riding roughshod over commu­
nities, and reshaping the lives and thinking of hundreds of millions of people, 
is based on assumptions that are antithetical to ours. We should articulately 
and unequivocally withdraw moral support from these practices and encour­
age all who truly care about human beings and the other beings that make up 
our Earth, to work directly for their benefit.
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